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Abstract—Public vehicle (PV) systems are promising trans-
portation systems for future smart cities which provide dynamic
ride-sharing services according to passengers’ requests. PVs are
driverless/self-driving electric vehicles which require frequent
recharging from smart grids. For such systems, the challenge lies
in both the efficient scheduling scheme to satisfy transportation
demands with service guarantee and the cost-effective charging
strategy under the real-time electricity pricing. In this paper, we
study the joint transportation and charging scheduling for PV
systems to balance the transportation and charging demands,
ensuring the long-term operation. We adopt a cake cutting game
model to capture the interactions among PV groups, the cloud
and smart grids. The cloud announces strategies to coordinate
the allocation of transportation and energy resources among
PV groups. All the PV groups try to maximize their joint
transportation and charging utilities. We propose an algorithm
to obtain the unique normalized Nash equilibrium point for this
problem. Simulations are performed to confirm the effects of
our scheme under the real taxi and power grid data sets of New
York City. Our results show that our scheme achieves almost
the same transportation performance compared with a heuristic
scheme, namely, transportation with greedy charging; however,
the average energy price of the proposed scheme is 10.86% lower
than the latter one.
Index Terms—Public vehicle systems, transportation, charging,
smart grids, real-time electricity pricing, cake cutting game.
I. INTRODUCTION
The public vehicle (PV) systems [1] [2] [3], also known
as the shared internet of vehicle systems or intelligent trans-
portation systems, provide high-quality ride-sharing services
in future smart cities. The vehicles in PV systems, called
PVs, are typically driverless/self-driving [4] electric vehicles
with large capacities just like buses. PVs are connected to
smart grids for self-charging. A PV system consists of three
main components: a cloud, passengers/users, and PVs. The
operation flow of a PV system is as follows. If a passenger/user
needs a trip service, he/she sends a request to the cloud via a
smart phone, including an earliest start time, a pickup position
(origin) and a dropoff position (destination), etc. Then the
cloud computes the ride matches between PVs and passengers,
M. Zhu is with the Shenzhen Institutes of Advanced Technology, Chinese
Academy of Sciences, Shenzhen, China, and the Department of Computer
Science and Engineering, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Shanghai, China,
E-mail: zhumingpassional@gmail.com, zhumingpassional@sjtu.edu.cn.
X.-Y. Liu is with the Electrical Engineering Department, Columbia Uni-
versity, New York City, US, and the Department of Computer Science
and Engineering, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Shanghai, China. E-mail:
xiaoyang@ee.columbia.edu.
X. Wang is with the Department of Electrical Engineering, Columbia
University, New York, NY, 10027, USA (E-mail: wangx@ee.columbia.edu).
*
*
3LFN8S
6RODUIDUPV
:LQG IDUPV
3RZHUSODQWV
Fig. 1. The V2G scenario: a PV system and the smart grid.
and calculates paths for PVs, and finally schedules a suitable
PV to drive him/her from the origin to the destination, wherein
the paths may be shared with others.
PVs are typically electric vehicles (EVs), and are connected
to smart grids for battery charging. Smart grids are envisioned
as the next-generation power grid systems that can intelli-
gently accommodate requests by all connected users. They
are equipped with a smart metering infrastructure capable of
sensing and measuring power consumptions from consumers
with the integration of advanced computing, control, infor-
mation and communication technologies [5]. The smart grids
will have more efficient, more economical and more reliable
power generations, distributions, and consumptions than the
conventional power grids. PVs and smart grids constitute com-
plicated vehicle-to-grid (V2G) ecosystems [6]. Fig. 1 shows
an overview of the target scenario including a PV system and
a smart grid.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work to
consider the joint transportation and charging scheduling prob-
lem for PV systems. Existing works focus only on either
the transportation or the charging problem for PV systems
or PV-like systems. For example, [7] proposes path planning
strategies without considering energy storage or charging
actions; whereas [8] proposes the charging strategies from
smart grids neglecting the transportation actions. In addition,
the charging scenario in PV systems is different from that in
existing works. For example, private EVs are parked 95% of
the time [9] and the batteries are usually charged at parking
lots at homes or working places most of the day. PVs have
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2much less parking time than private EVs since they are shared
by all passengers, and they need frequent charging since they
serve more passengers with high occupancy rates [1]. PVs’
routes and schedules vary with times and locations for the
constantly changing transportation demands. Therefore, how
to take advantage of the limited amount of idle time to charge
the batteries becomes an important problem. We consider the
joint transportation and charging scheduling problem (JTCSP)
for PV systems. The goal is to balance the transportation and
charging demands to guarantee the long-term operation of PV
systems with less charging costs and more profits.
The challenges of JTCSP are as follows: 1) The cloud
should consider the transportation demands from passengers
which vary with times and locations. 2) The charging demands
of PV groups should be satisfied with less costs under the
scenario of real-time electricity pricing. 3) The cloud should
ensure PVs to have sufficient energy to serve passengers at any
time even if the energy price is high, otherwise, some PVs may
not have sufficient energy to serve passengers. Too many or
too few PVs engaged in transportation or charging will affect
the profits and energy storages, e.g., some PVs engaged in
transportation may have insufficient energy, and some other
PVs engaged in charging may not provide transportation
services to earn profits.
The main contributions of this paper include the following:
1) We adopt the cake cutting game [10] to capture the trans-
portation and charging patterns of PVs, and then use a novel
utility model to reflect the transportation benefits, satisfactions
for charged batteries, and charging costs. Suppose each player
has a different opinion as to which part of a cake is more
valuable. The aim of a cake cutting game [10] is to divide a
cake among multiple players so that everyone values his or her
piece no less than any other piece. In this paper, we make use
of the cake cutting game in selecting different transportation
and charging vehicles for different PV groups. 2) We analyze
the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium in this
cake cutting game, and analyze the features of the game in
the JTCSP compared with existing works, e.g., those that only
consider transportation or charging. 3) We propose an efficient
solution to JTCSP to balance the transportation and charging
demands of PVs which achieves a unique normalized Nash
equilibrium point in the cake cutting game. 4) Simulations are
performed to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed
solution under the real transportation and power grid data sets
of New York City, and then compare the performance of our
scheme with a heuristic scheme.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section
II describes the related work. Section III presents the system
model. Our problem is formulated in Section IV. The analysis
about the JTCSP is given in Section V, and a solution is
proposed in Section VI. Section VII presents the simulation
results. Section VIII concludes this paper.
II. RELATED WORKS
Transportation is the most important task of PV systems
[11] [12], wherein path planning strategies [13] directly deter-
mine the quality of service (QoS) of passengers. Some path
planning solutions in PV systems or PV-like systems (e.g., taxi
sharing systems) have been proposed. Zhu et al. [1] propose a
path planning strategy with balanced QoS (short waiting time
and limited detour) in PV systems. Atasoy et al. [14] propose
a flexible mobility-on-demand system utilizing three services:
taxi, shared-taxi and mini-bus, which can balance consumer
surplus and the operator’s profits. Herbawi et al. [15] propose
a genetic algorithm to solve the ride-matching problem with
time windows in ride-sharing. Fagnant et al. [16] present a
customer waiting time model of shared autonomous vehicles,
and find that it can save 10 times the number of cars needed for
self-owned vehicle trips. Jung et al. [17] propose a dynamic
dispatching algorithm in taxi sharing systems using the hybrid
simulated annealing aiming at minimizing the total travel time
and maximizing the profits. However, the above works do not
consider the energy demands of vehicles.
To ensure the long-term transportation of EVs, charging
strategies with low costs are required. Recently, the charging
problem of EVs becomes an important topic, e.g., the charging
cost minimization problem [18] [19] and the waiting time
minimization problem [20] [21]. Rivera et al. [18] propose
an optimization framework for achieving computational scala-
bility based on the alternating directions method of multipliers
with two objectives, valley filling and cost-minimal charging
with grid capacity constraints. Franco et al. [19] present
a mixed-integer linear programming model to minimize the
total energy costs, which corresponds to the EV charging
coordination problem in electrical distribution systems. Zhu
et al. [20] propose two centralized algorithms to minimize
the total charging time, i.e., EV travelling time, the queuing
time, and the actual charging time at charging stations. Zhang
et al. [21] use independent Markov processes to model the
uncertainty of the arrival of EVs, the intermittence of the
renewable energy, and the variation of grid power prices, and
propose a Markov decision process framework to minimize
the mean waiting time for EVs under the long-term constraint
on the cost. Weerdt et al. [22] propose a routing policy that
minimizes EVs’ expected journey time including the waiting
time at charging stations.
Game theoretic approaches are applied to transportation
systems to optimize traffic flows, travel time, etc. Groot
et al. [23] propose three approaches based on reverse Stack-
elberg game to reach a system-optimal distribution of traffics
on freeway routes, e.g., to minimize the total trip time and
to reduce traffic emissions in urban areas. The optimization
of the travel time and the traffic flows at intersections is a
key issue since it is one of the major bottlenecks for urban
traffic congestions. To reduce the average travel time delay
at uncontrolled intersections, Elhenawy et al. [24] propose
a chicken-game-based algorithm for controlling autonomous
vehicle movements equipped with cooperative adaptive cruise
control systems. Bui et al. [25] propose a Cournot model and
a Stackelberg model to optimize the traffic flows for smart
traffic light control at intersections. Farokhi et al. [26] adopt
an atomic congestion game model to capture the interactions
between the car traffic and the truck platooning incentives.
Several novel pricing mechanisms and scheduling strategies
have been proposed in on-demand mobility systems. Drwal
3TABLE I
VARIABLES AND NOTATIONS
J number of all PVs in the city.
c battery capacity of PVs.
r charged energy in a time slot (an hour be default).
I set of all PVGs in time slot t.
I number of all PVGs in time slot t in the city.
mi,t number of unfully charged PVs in region i in time slot t.
T time slot set.
t time slot in T .
xi,t strategy of PVG i in time slot t.
di,t transportation demands of PVG i in time slot t.
dt total transportation demands of all PVGs in time slot t.
Ert total remaining energy of all PVs in time slot t.
pt real-time electricity price in time slot t.
ui,t utility function of PVG i in time slot t.
Ωi,t feasible strategy set of PVG i in time slot t.
Ωt feasible strategy sets of all PVGs in time slot t.
xt strategies of all PVGs in time slot t.
ut objective function vector of all PVGs in time slot t.
E-t consumed energy of all PVs in time slot t.
E+t charging demands of all PVs in time slot t.
ni,t number of transportation PVs in region i in time slot t.
ai,t number of all PVs in region i in time slot t.
fi,t number of fully (or near fully) charged PVs in region i
in time slot t.
φi,t number of transportation PVs of PVG i in time slot t.
ψi,t number of charging PVs of PVG i in time slot t.
et al. [27] propose pricing mechanisms to balance the de-
mands of different parking stations, reduce the cost of manual
relocations of vehicles, and maximize the operator’s revenue.
However, this solution only considers the transportation perfor-
mance, and does not consider the energy demands of vehicles
from smart grids. Rigas et al. [28] study the scenario where
EVs are hired in on-demand mobility systems and there exist
multiple battery swap facility points. Its aim is to maximize
the number of passengers that are served. They focus on
the transportation performance with limited travel ranges and
simplify the charging problem as swapping batteries in facility
points, ignoring the effects of the real-time pricing of smart
grids, e.g., how to reduce the charging costs with the guarantee
of providing transportation services. Our solution proposed
in this paper considers the joint transportation and charging
strategies of vehicles over one day and multiple days under
the scenario of real-time electricity pricing.
III. SYSTEM MODEL
We first describe the PV model, and then present the smart
grid model. All the important variables and notations in this
article are summarized in Table I.
A. PV Model
We assume all J PVs in a city have identical battery
capacity c (kwh) and identical charged energy r (kwh) in a
time slot (an hour by default). To explore the time-dependent
transportation and charging patterns, we introduce time slot set
T = {0, 1, . . . , T − 1}. The PVs are considered fully charged
if their remaining energy is greater than (c − r) since the
charging time is less than a time slot, which is too short,
and the others are unfully charged. Fully charged PVs can
only choose to serve passengers. While unfully charged PVs
have two choices, transportation or charging. To ensure the
transportation of the next time slot, at each time the remaining
energy of a PV should not be less than the consumed energy
in a time slot.
The city is divided into I regions, and in each region i, mi,t
denotes the number of unfully charged PVs in time slot t and
they form public vehicle group (PVG) i. All PVGs in time
slot t are denoted by a set I with the number I . We see that
I and I may vary over time and should be updated in each
time slot, while J does not change.
PVG Transportation Model: The strategy of PVG i ∈ I
in time slot t is denoted by xi,t ∈ [0, 1], which is the ratio
of PVs in PVG i that will be used for transportation, and the
remaining portion will charge their batteries. In each time slot
t, the cloud calculates the transportation demands of PVG i
denoted by di,t, i.e., the number of transportation PVs. The
total transportation demands of all PVGs in time slot t is dt =∑
i di,t.
PVG Charging Model: We assume that each charging PV
will charge batteries with the identical charged energy r in
a time slot. For PVG i, the charged energy in the time slot
[t, t+ 1] are rmi,t (1− xi,t).
Discharging in peak electricity price periods can bring more
benefits for EVs. However, we do not consider discharging in
PV systems for several reasons. 1) The most important actions
of PVs are transportation and charging since transportation
brings profits and charging ensures the ability of making
profits. 2) In general, the transportation peak time coincides
with the electricity price peak time according to the taxi
trip data [29] and grid data [30] in New York City. The
urgent action at the energy consumption peak time [31] is
charging not discharging. Thus, if we consider discharging, the
transportation demands may not be fully satisfied. 3) Even we
consider discharging, the profits through V2G are 90∼4,000
US dollars per year per vehicle [32], which can not match with
that from transportation services. Due to the above reasons,
we assume that PVs only have two actions: transportation and
charging.
B. Smart Grid Model
Generally, smart grids serve primary consumers such as
industries, houses, and offices with high priority. After meeting
the demands of the primary consumers, smart grids wish to
sell energy to secondary users, e.g., PVs. We assume that, the
cloud of PV systems can requests a certain amount of energy
from smart grids. In the electricity market, the real-time prices
(RTPs) [33] vary with the total demands, which can reduce the
peak-to-average load ratio through encouraging consumers to
shift their usages to off-peak hours. Let the RTP in time slot
t be pt. The electricity pricing model is
pt = α0
(
Lt
C0
)k0
, (1)
Lt =
∑
i
Li,t, (2)
where α0 and k0 are predefined pricing constants by the smart
grids, C0 is the capacity of the electricity markets [34], Li,t
4is the electricity load of region i in time slot t, and Lt is
the total electricity load in time slot t, including that from
industries, houses, offices and secondary users such as EVs.
It has been proven that the overall energy costs are minimal
when electricity consumptions are balanced in each equal-size
time slot [34]. Then the charging cost of PVG i in the time
slot [t, t+ 1] is r ptmi,t (1− xi,t).
IV. PROBLEM FORMULATION
We first present a novel utility model for PVGs, and then
formulate the JTCSP.
A. PVG Utility Model
The utility model for each PVG should reflect its transporta-
tion and charging willingness considering the trip demands of
passengers, electricity prices, and its own energy states. The
utility function of PVG i is formulated as
ui,t = −(mi,t xi,t − di,t)2 + α1mi,t ln(2− xi,t)
− α2 ptmi,t (1− xi,t), (3)
where α1 and α2 are constants. ui,t has the following terms:
• The term −(mi,t xi,t − di,t)2 denotes the transportation
utility. Clearly, when the number of transportation PVs
of PVG i equals di,t, it obtains the maximum utility.
Note that if mi,txi,t is larger than the critical value di,t,
the utility decreases for several reasons such as waiting
costs and parking fees, and if it is less than di,t, the utility
also decreases since it can not satisfy the transportation
demands.
• The term α1mi,t ln(2−xi,t) denotes the satisfaction level
for charged energy with the weight α1. The charged
energy r in a time slot is omitted since it is included
in the weight α1, which can also be seen in the third
term of the utility model. We adopt a logarithmic utility
model to denote the satisfaction level since it can quantify
user satisfactions with diminishing returns [35], which is
widely used in designing the utility for energy consumers,
e.g., [36] [37]. We use (2 − xi,t) instead of (1 − xi,t)
to ensure that it is always positive and the logarithmic
function is always available.
• The term −α2 ptmi,t (1−xi,t) denotes the charging fees
with the weight −α2.
B. Problem Statement
The transportation and charging strategies of PVs are co-
ordinated rather than directly controlled for the following
reasons. 1) This can reduce the cost of data transmission
through 4G/5G. During the charging periods, some data should
be exchanged between PVs and the cloud, e.g., the remaining
energy of batteries, the electricity prices, and some information
about charging stations. 2) This can reduce the cost of data
storage. PVs are driverless/self-driving EVs, which generate
a large amount of data even within a short period, e.g., one
GB data per second [38]. 3) More computing resources can
be assigned to transportation to provide better services for
passengers. PV systems need more computing resources in
solving path planning problems [3] [39] based on traffic big
data. Moreover, the cloud has to predict in real-time the vehicle
speed [40], transportation demands [8] in each region of smart
cities.
We explore the cake cutting game [41] [10] [42] to coordi-
nate the transportation and charging strategies for all PVGs.
The cake cutting game is one of the most fundamental games
for fair division with the aiming of dividing the cake (here,
it means the transportation and charging resouces) fairly. The
cake cutting game can encapsulate the important problem of
allocating heterogeneous resources among multiple players
with different preferences. Each PVG has its own transporta-
tion demands, and energy states. Therefore, we adopt the cake
cutting game to analyze the JTCSP in PV systems.
PVGs are noncooperative since they do not communicate
with each other, but they may interact with the cloud and smart
grids by the controlled signaling through smart meters. The
cloud calculates the charging demands of all PVs {E+t }t∈T
ahead of the day, and the transportation demands of each
PVG {di,t}i∈I and the total transportation demands {dt}i∈I in
each time slot. Then PVGs select their best response strategies
{xi,t}i∈I to maximize their utilities.
The optimization problem of the PVG i in time slot t is
formulated as
max
xi,t
ui,t, (4)
s.t. r
∑
i∈I
mi,t (1− xi,t) = E+t , (5)∑
i∈I
mi,t xi,t ≥ dt, (6)
xi,t ∈ [0, 1],∀i ∈ I. (7)
We see that, for any PVG, the first and second constraints are
shared by all PVGs. The first constraint indicates that the total
charged energy should be equal to the charging demands E+t
in time slot t from smart grids. The second constraint indicates
that the total number of transportation PVs should not be
less than the transportation demands calculated by the cloud,
dt. The third constraint indicates the bound of the PVG’s
strategy xi,t. Herein, the second constraint can always hold
since the transportation demand dt is determined by the cloud
using a scheduling strategy at the beginning of each time slot,
which is described in Algorithm 2 of Section VI-C. If the
transportation demands are too high to be covered for a given
set of PVs, the cloud will use more PVs to serve passengers
except the charging PVs, and accordingly, the passengers may
have to wait for longer time.
Let Ωi,t be the feasible strategy set of PVG i in time slot
t which satisfies the three constraints in Problem (4). Let Ωt
be the feasible strategy sets of all PVGs in time slot t, i.e.,
Ωt := Ω1,t × . . .ΩI,t.
We formulate the JTCSP based on PVGs rather than individ-
ual PVs for several reasons: 1) This can reduce the operating
complexity especially in large cities with a large number PVs,
since the number of PVGs is much less than that of PVs.
2) This can save a lot of computing resources such that the
energy management costs can be reduced.
5The JTCSP is a cake cutting game [41] [10], and in time
slot t it is defined by
(I,Ωt,xt,ut),
where
• I denotes the players (PVGs) in time slot t in the cake
cutting game;
• Ωt := Ω1,t × . . .ΩI,t is the strategy set of all PVGs in
time slot t;
• xt := (xi,t)i∈I denotes the strategies of all PVGs in time
slot t;
• ut := (ui,t)i∈I denotes the objective function vector of
all PVGs to maximize in time slot t.
V. PROBLEM ANALYSIS
The first and second constraints in Problem (4) imply that
the action of a PVG is constrained by the actions of other
PVGs, which are known as shared/coupled constraints [43].
The games with shared constraints bring particular complexity
to tackle. In this section, we prove the existence and unique-
ness of equilibrium for our JTCSP.
Lemma V.1. An equilibrium point exists in the JTCSP for PV
systems.
Proof. Since all PVGs have the same shared constraints, the
JTCSP is a generalized Nash equilibrium problem (GNEP).
The GNEP extends the classical Nash equilibrium problem by
assuming that each player’s feasible strategy set can depend on
the rival players’ strategies. The utility functions of PVGs are
continuous and concave and their strategy sets are closed and
convex. Therefore, the JTCSP is a concave n-person game.
According to Rosen’s work (Theorem 1 in [44]), “a Nash
equilibrium point exists for every concave n-person game”,
Lemma V.1 is obtained.
From Lemma V.1, we know that there may exist multiple
Nash equilibria in the JTCSP in PV systems. Now, consider
the following optimization problem for each utility function:
max
xt
σ(xt,wt) = max
xt
∑
i∈I
wi,t ui,t, (8)
s.t. θ(xt) ≤ 0, (9)
where wi,t is a weight factor, and θ(xt) = [θ1(xt), . . . ,
θM (xt)]
T collects M constraint sets which constitute a set
M = {1, . . . ,M}. Here, M = 3, which can be seen from the
constraints form Problem (4). Denote the Lagrange multiplier
vector for PVG i as λi,t, and λt = (λ1,t,λ2,t, . . . ,λI,t)T .
The generalized Nash equilibrium xt ∈ Ωt is called a
normalized Nash equilibrium (NNE) with weights if and only
if it satisfies the following Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) [45]
conditions:
−wi,t∇xi,tui,t + λTi,t∇xi,tθ(xi,t, x−i,t) = 0, (10)
λTi,t θ(xi,t, x−i,t) = 0, (11)
λi,t ≥ 0, (12)
θ(xi,t, x−i,t) ≤ 0, (13)
where
λi,t =
λ¯t
wi,t
,∀i ∈ I. (14)
Theorem V.1. A unique normalized Nash equilibrium (NNE)
exists for the JTCSP in PV systems.
Proof. In PV systems, PVGs aim to maximize their utilities
through buying low-cost energy from smart grids and pro-
viding transportation services for more profits. The objective
function of each player in a jointly convex GNEP is continu-
ously differentiable. According to Rosen’s work (Theorem 2 in
[44]), “there exists a unique NNE in concave n-player games
if the joint utility function σ(xt,wt) =
∑
i∈I wi,t ui,t with
wt = [w1,t, . . . , wI,t] is diagonally strictly concave”. Next,
we prove σ(xt,wt) is diagonally strictly concave.
We define g(xt,wt) as the pseudogradient for σ(xt,wt):
g(xt,wt) = [w1,t∇x1,t u1,t (x1,t), w2,t∇x2,t u2,t (x2,t), . . . ,
wI,t∇xI,t uI,t (xI,t)]T . According to Rosen’s work (Theorem
6 in [44]), “a sufficient condition that σ(xt,wt) be diagonally
strictly concave for xt ∈ Ωt and wt > 0 is that the symmetric
matrix [G(xt,wt) +GT (xt,wt)] be negative definite, where
G(xt,wt) is the Jacobian with respect to xt of g(xt,wt)”.
The second derivative on the utility function ui,t in (3) with
respect to xi,t is
κi,t =
∂2ui,t
∂x2i,t
= −2m2i,t −
α1mi,t
(xi,t − 2)2 . (15)
Clearly, κi,t < 0,∀i ∈ I, t ∈ T . So ui,t is strictly concave.
The Jacobian of g(xt,wt) with respect to xt is
G(xt,wt) =

w1,t κ1,t 0 · · · 0
0 w2,t κ2,t · · · 0
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 · · · wI,t κI,t
 . (16)
Clearly, G(xt,wt) is negative definite, and the matrix
[G(xt,wt) +
(
G(xt,wt)
)T
] = 2G(xt,wt) is also negative
definite. So σ(xt,wt) is diagonally strictly concave.
Hence, Theorem V.1 is proved.
We see that different wts will yield different NNEs. How-
ever, the NNE is unique for each fixed wt. Now and hence-
forth, we consider the NNE with the identical weights, i.e.,
w1,t = w2,t = . . . = wI,t = 1, and we get
λi,t = λ¯t,∀i ∈ I. (17)
We know that, all PVGs have the same Lagrange multipliers
for all constraints.
Next, we explore the relationships between a variational
inequality problem and the JTCSP. The variational inequality
problem VI(F,Ω) is to find a point x∗ ∈ Ω such that
〈F (x∗), x− x∗〉 ≥ 0,∀x ∈ Ω, (18)
where Ω is a closed and convex set, and 〈·〉 denotes the inner
product, and F is a continuous function.
Theorem V.2. The variational inequality problem VI(Ft,Ωt)
with the constraint θ(xt) ≤ 0 where Ft := −(∇xi,tui,t)i∈I
is monotonic. The solution to VI(Ft,Ωt) is the NNE with
6identical weights, and is also called a variational equilibrium.
Therefore, the solution to VI(Ft,Ωt) is the solution to the
JTCSP in PV systems.
Proof. The KKT conditions for VI(Ft,Ωt) are
Ft + λ¯
T
t ∇xtθ(xt) = 0, (19)
λ¯Tt θ(xt) = 0, (20)
λ¯t ≥ 0, (21)
θ(xt) ≤ 0. (22)
We can see that, the KKT conditions for VI(Ft,Ωt) are
exactly (10)∼(13) with the same Lagrange multipliers for all
PVGs in the JTCSP. If w1,t = w2,t = . . . = wI,t = 1,
−Ft is g(xt,wt), and correspondingly, the Jacobian of −Ft
is G(xt,wt). From Theorem V.1, we know G(xt,wt) is
negative definite, so Ft is positive definite. Therefore, Ft is
strictly monotonic. So Theorem V.2 is proved. The method
to the variational inequality problem can be used to solve the
GNEP [46].
VI. PROPOSED SOLUTION
In this section, we first describe the basic idea of our
proposed solution for solving the JTCSP in PV systems,
and then present two key routines: charging scheduling and
transportation scheduling, and finally detail the scheme to
obtain the unique NNE.
Why is there an optimal solution to the JTCSP in PV
systems? Essentially, both the transportation and charging
strategies focus on the profits earned by providing services
for passengers: transportation strategies focus on the current
profits from passengers, while charging strategies focus on
the future profits since the charged energy will be used for
transportation to make profits. If we only focus on the current
transportation, the future profits may not be fully obtained
since some PVs may not have sufficient energy. If we only
focus on the current charging, the charging costs can be
minimized, while the profits from the current transportation
may not be maximized.
A. Basic Idea
We assume that the trip requests of passengers and RTP
of the next day are known in advance. The basic idea of our
solution is as follows. 1) The cloud performs the charging
scheduling one day ahead to calculate charging demands.
2) In each time slot, the cloud performs the transportation
scheduling according to the real-time trip requests to calculate
transportation demands. 3) We use a projection method to
solve the variational inequality problem and obtain the best
response strategies of PVGs. 4) Each PVG selects the a part
of PVs to provide transportation services and others to charge
batteries according to its best strategy. With respect to the
transportation PVs, we use PCI [1] to schedule them to serve
passengers, and with respect to the charging PVs, they travel
to the nearest charging stations to charge batteries.
B. Charging Scheduling
We assume that the cloud knows the trip requests of one
day ahead, therefore, the charging scheduling of PVs can be
calculated. The objective of charging scheduling is to minimize
the total charging costs considering of energy consumptions
of PVs and RTPs. Suppose that the PVs have infinite energy
and the energy consumption is positively correlated with the
travel distance. We schedule all PVs using the PCI algorithm
[1] to serve passengers, and then record the travel distance and
consumed energy of all PVs in each time slot {E-t}t∈T . The
process of PCI is as follows: First, all requests will be sorted
by their waiting time from the maximum to the minimum,
i.e., the passengers with longest waiting time will have the
highest scheduling rank. Second, insert each request to the
path of each PV and then calculate the insertion cost (total
travel distance of PVs) and detour ratio. Third, if we can find
the ride-match and path with the minimum insertion cost from
all paths within limited detour ratio, schedule the PV to serve
the corresponding request, otherwise the request will be put
to a waiting list.
Algorithm 1: Charging Scheduling One Day Ahead
1: Initialize the remaining energy for all PVs in
the city as infinity;
2: Use PCI [1] to schedule PVs to serve passengers;
3: Record {E-t}t∈T ;
4: Calculate {E+t }t∈T by solving Problem (23) using
a convex solver;
5: return {E+t }t∈T ;
The optimization problem of charging scheduling is formu-
lated as
min
∑
t∈T
ptE
+
t , (23)
s.t. Ert+1 = E
r
t − E-t + E+t ,∀t ∈ {0, . . . , T − 2}, (24)
Ert ≥ (1 + ρ) max(E-t, J emin),∀t ∈ {1, . . . , T − 1}, (25)
ErT−1 − E-T−1 + E+T−1 ≥ Er0, (26)
0 ≤ E+t ≥ (J − dt) r, ∀t ∈ {0, . . . , T − 1}, (27)
0 ≤ Ert ≤ J c,∀t ∈ {0, . . . , T − 1}, (28)
where E+t and E
-
t are the charging demands and consumed
energy of all PVs in time slot t respectively, Ert is the total
remaining energy of all PVs in time slot t, ρ > 0 is a
constant, J is the number of all PVs in the city, and emin
is the minimum energy of any PV to travel to the nearest
the charging station. The first constraint is on the relationship
between the consumed energy, the charging demands (charged
energy), and the remaining energy in two consecutive time
slots. The second constraint means that the remaining energy
in time slot t is at least (1 + ρ) of the consumed energy
used on transportation, which ensures the travel of the PVs
in the next time slot, at the same time, the remaining energy
is no less than the (1 + ρ) of the energy consumed on the
travel to charging stations. We assume that the final remaining
energy is not less than the initial energy, which is reflected
in the third constraint. The fourth constraint implies that the
7charged energy has a upper bound if all PVs except for
the transportation ones decide to charge batteries. The fifth
constraint points out that the remaining energy should not
exceed the total energy capacities of all PVs. Problem (23) is
a standard convex problem, and can be solved by any standard
convex solver. The procedure for charging scheduling of one
day is summarized in Algorithm 1.
C. Transportation Scheduling
In time slot t, the cloud calculates transportation scheduling,
i.e., the number of transportation PVs, ni,t, in each region i
given the trip requests using a vehicle scheduling scheme. We
get the number of unfully charged PVs in region i, i.e., the
number of PVs in PVG i:
mi,t = ai,t − fi,t, (29)
where ai,t is the number of all PVs in region i in time slot t,
and fi,t is the number of fully (or near fully) charged PVs in
region i in time slot t. In time slot t we use PCI [1] to schedule
PVs to serve passengers, and the transportation demands of
PVG i in time slot t is
di,t = max(ni,t − fi,t, 0). (30)
The total transportation demands in time slot t is
dt =
∑
i
di,t. (31)
Algorithm 2: Transportation Scheduling in Time Slot t
1: Record the initial states of all PVs and passen-
gers;
2: Use PCI [1] to serve the passengers in the time
slot [t, t+ 1];
3: Record the number of transportation PVs in each
region {ni,t}i∈I ;
4: Calculate di,t and dt using (30) and (31) respec-
tively;
5: Put all PVs and passengers to initial states;
6: Return di,t and dt;
Algorithm 2 shows the procedure of transportation schedul-
ing in time slot t. The positions, remaining energy, energy
consuming rates, service states of all PVs, and the service
states (pickup or dropoff) of passengers are called initial states,
which are recorded in line 1. Line 2 uses the PCI algorithm
to serve passengers considering of energy consumptions and
energy limits. Line 3 records the number of transportation PVs
of all regions. Line 4 calculates the transportation demands
di,t of PVG i and the total transportation demands dt. Line 5
means that all PVs and passengers return to their initial states.
D. Solution to JTCSP
From Theorem V.2, we know that Ft in VI(Ft,Ωt) is
monotonic with respect to its strategy set. So we can use a
hyperplane projection method to solve it and the convergence
can be guaranteed [47]. Here, we use SSPM (Solodov-Svaiter
projection method) [48] to solve VI(Ft,Ωt). The projection
operator PΩt is defined as
PΩt(xt) = arg min
x′t∈Ωt
‖x′t − xt‖. (32)
We introduce parameters γ1 ∈ (0, 1), γ2 ∈ (0, 1), γ3 > 1,
µ > 0, and η > 0. µ(k) is calculated by
µ(k) = min(γ3 η
(k−1), 1). (33)
The projected residual function is defined as
ν(x
(k)
t , µ
(k)) := x
(k)
t − PΩt
(
x
(k)
t − µ(k)Ft(x(k)t )
)
. (34)
Let ζ(k) be the smallest nonnegative integer which satisfies
〈Ft(x(k)t − γζ
(k)
1 µ
(k) ν(x
(k)
t , µ
(k))), ν(x
(k)
t , µ
(k))〉
≥ γ2
µ(k)
‖ν(x(k)t , µ(k))‖2, (35)
where 〈·〉 denotes the inner product. η(k) and y(k) are calcu-
lated by
η(k) = γζ
(k)
1 µ
(k), (36)
y(k) = x
(k)
t − η(k) ν(x(k)t , µ(k)). (37)
The halfspace H(k) is defined as
H(k) := {x(k)t ∈ RI |〈Ft(y(k)),x(k)t − y(k)〉 ≤ 0}. (38)
Algorithm 3: SSPM
1: Initialize x(0)t ∈ Ωt, η(−1) > 0, γ1 ∈ (0, 1), γ2 ∈
(0, 1), γ3 > 1, ν(x
(0)
t , µ
(0)) = 1, k = 0. Set a small
positive value for a bound ;
2: repeat
3: Calculate µ(k) and ν(x(k)t , µ
(k)) using (33) and
(34) respectively;
4: if ‖ν(x(k)t , µ(k))‖ < 
5: break;
6: else
7: Calculate the smallest nonnegative integer ζ(k)
satisfying (35), and then calculate η(k) and y(k)
using (36) and (37) respectively;
8: Calculate the halfsapce H(k) using (38), and
then calculate x(k+1)t using (39);
9: k ← k + 1;
10: end if
11: until ‖ν(x(k)t , µ(k))‖ < ;
12: return xt;
8Algorithm 4: Joint Transportation and Charging
Scheduling (JTCS)
1: Perform charging scheduling one day ahead using
Algorithm 1;
2: for t ∈ T
3: Update each PVG i, ∀i ∈ I;
4: Perform transportation scheduling in time slot t
using Algorithm 2;
5: The cloud announces the charging demands and
transportation demands;
6: Calculate the best response strategies x∗t =
{x∗1,t, . . . , x∗I,t} of all PVGs using SSPM
(Algorithm 3) given the cloud’s strategies;
7: for PVG i ∈ I
8: φi,t ← dmi,tx∗i,te;
9: ψi,t ← mi,t − φi,t;
10: end
11: end
Then x(k+1)t is obtained by projecting x
(k)
t onto the inter-
section of its feasible set Ωt and the halfspace H(k):
x
(k+1)
t = PΩt∩H(k)(x
(k)
t ). (39)
The procedure of SSPM [48] is shown in Algorithm 3. Line
1 is initialization. Lines 2∼11 constitute an iterative process
until the projected residual is less than a preset bound. Lines
3 and 8 imply that only two projections are needed in each
iteration.
Algorithm 4 shows the overall algorithm for the JTCSP.
Line 1 uses Algorithm 1 to perform the charging scheduling
in one day. The “for” loop between lines 2∼11 indicates
that in each time slot the SSPM method will be executed
once. Line 3 means that in each time slot all PVGs will be
updated, since the unfully charged PVs in each region may
change. Line 6 uses SSPM (Algorithm 3) to get the best
response strategies of PVGs. In lines 8 and 9, φi,t and ψi,t are
the numbers of transportation and charging PVs respectively
of PVG i in time slot t. Finally, for PVG i, the φi,t PVs
with the maximum remaining energy are selected to provide
transportation services and others to charge batteries.
E. Comparison with Existing Approaches
There exist two cakes in the JTCSP in PV systems, a
transportation cake and a charging cake. The proposed JTCS
algorithm considers how to cut the two cakes to allocate
transportation and charging resources among PVGs. However,
if we only consider cutting the transportation or charging cake,
the process of cutting the other cake will be in a disorderly
state.
In the optimization problem (4) of PVG i in PV systems, we
see that the first constraint implies the condition in cutting the
charging cake, and the second constraint implies the condition
in cutting the transportation cake. The utility model in (3)
reflects the transportation and charging utilities. However, if
we only consider cutting the transportation cake, the utility
model of PVG i is
vi = −(mi,txi,t − di,t)2, (40)
Fig. 2. Manhattan in New York City.
and the corresponding optimization problem is
max
xi,t
vi,t, (41)
s.t.
∑
i∈I
mi,t xi,t ≥ dt, (42)
xi,t ∈ [0, 1],∀i ∈ I. (43)
We see that, Problem (41) have a different objective function
and different constraints compared with Problem (4). So if we
only consider cutting transportation or charging cake, how to
cut the other cake will be neglected.
The proposed JTCS algorithm always converge to the NNE
at each timeslot in the JTCSP, since the projection method
SSPM in the JTCS algorithm always converges to the optimal
solution to VI(Ft,Ωt). In [48], it is shown that, SSPM
converges to a solution of the variational inequality problem
under the only assumption that its function is continuous and
monotonic. In Theorem V.2, we know that Ft is continuous
and monotonic, therefore, the solution to VI(Ft,Ωt) is the
NNE with identical weights.
VII. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we first describe the simulation settings, and
then present the simulation results based on real data sets.
We compare the JTCS algorithm with a heuristic solution:
transportation with greedy charging (TGC), where we first use
the PCI algorithm proposed in [1] to provide transportation
services and then schedule all the other unfully charged PVs
to charge batteries until fully charged.
A. Simulation Settings
PV Setting: We use 500 EVs, Yutong E7 [49] (China), to
study the transportation and charging patterns of PVs, although
they are not self-driving vehicles now. The number of seats
of Yutong E7 is 10∼30, and here we assume that each PV
has 16 seats. Each PV has electricity capacity of 45 kwh,
and the maximum travel distance with fully charged battery
is 150 km, i.e., it consumes 0.3 kwh each km. Under 220V
voltage, the batteries can be fully charged within 8 hours,
i.e., the charged energy one hour is 5.625 kwh. We assume
that the initial remaining energy of all PVs follows a uniform
distribution over [32, 41] kwh. Assuming that all PVs travel
along the shortest path between any two positions (origins or
destinations of requests) in PCI algorithm with the identical
speed 30 km/h.
Road Map Data: Fig. 2 shows the map of Manhattan with
about 60 km2 in New York City, where black lines are roads,
green points are nodes, and red points are charging stations,
9Fig. 3. Distribution of trip requests in Manhattan. Fig. 4. CDF of trip distance in Manhattan. Fig. 5. CDF of trip fares in Manhattan.
and the blue lines divide the map into five regions. The road
map is extracted through the openstreetmap [50], and six types
of ways are selected: primary, secondary, tertiary, motorway,
motorway link, and residential, and others such as trunk,
unclassified, are ignored. Finally, 3,900 ways and 29,792 nodes
are filtered. The longitudes and latitudes of charging stations
are extracted from the Google map, and then they are moved
to the nearest nodes on roads.
New York City Taxi Data: We use the taxi data set (yellow
records) of the New York City during January 1∼31, 2016
[29]. Each record contains several useful fields for our study,
including passenger count, pickup time, dropoff time, trip
distance, latitudes/longitudes of origins, latitudes/longitudes
of destinations, fares, taxes, tips, and total payment. There
are 134,721 requests whose origins and destinations both are
in Manhattan on January 5 (Tuesday), 2016. Fig. 3 shows
the distribution of these trip requests (only in Manhattan) in
each hour on January 5, 2016. The time begins at 3:00 for
three reasons. 1) This time is one of the most important shift
handover time in taxi companies in many cities [51]. 2) The
number of trip requests of this time is almost the minimum
of one day [1] [14]. 3) The base loads and energy demands at
this time are both almost the minimum in one day [30] [52].
Fig. 4 and Fig. 5 show the CDF of trip distance and trip fares
(tips and taxes are not included) respectively in Mahattan on
January 5, 2016. We see that, about 70% of trip distance is less
than 2 km, and 70% of trip fares are less than 10 US dollars.
To make the performance more stable, we only choose the
trip requests with travel distance no less than 2 km, and the
number of trip requests is reduced to 41,341.
Smart Grid Data: The online data set of RTPs is shown
in Fig. 6, which is provided by the Commonwealth Edison
Company [53]. We see that the RTP morning and evening peak
time is 9:00 and 17:00 respectively, and the RTP evening peak
is much higher than the morning peak.
The parameter settings are summarized in Table II. α1 and
α2 should reflect the weights of satisfaction level of charging
and the charging fees, and should be tested to represent the
utilities of PVGs. As we have described in the previous
section, γ1 ∈ (0, 1), γ2 ∈ (0, 1), γ3 > 1, µ > 0, η > 0,
therefore, we set γ1 = 0.4, γ2 = 0.5, γ3 = 1.5, µ = 1,
η = 1. emin denotes the minimum energy of any PV to travel
to the nearest the charging station, and 3 kwh is generally
TABLE II
VALUES OF PARAMETERS IN SIMULATION SETTINGS
α1 α2 η γ1 γ2 γ3
20 5 1 0.4 0.5 1.5
µ emin ρ 
1 3 0.2 10−3
enough for one PV in Manhattan since it can travel at least 10
km according to our assumptions. We set ρ = 0.2, which is
generally enough for the energy in the next time slot.  = 10−3
is a widely accepted bound in SSPM.
B. Results
We present the performance of JTCS and TGC in terms
of eight metrics: convergence of PVG strategies, convergence
of PVG utilities, number of transportation PVs in each hour,
consumed energy in each hour, charged energy in each hour,
energy payment in each hour, average energy price and total
payment, and remaining energy of all PVs. Finally, the scala-
bility of JTCS and TGC is discussed.
The first metric is the convergence of PVG strategies at
the time 3:00, which is shown by Fig. 7. We see that,
after seven iterations, the proposed JTCS algorithm with five
PVGs converges to the NNE. Different PVGs have different
best response strategies according to their transportation and
charging demands.
The second metric is the convergence of PVG utilities at
the time 3:00, which is presented by Fig. 8. We see that, all
the utility values are negative since two items in the utility
function (3) are negative and only one item is positive, and
the utility values converge to the NNE with the converges of
strategies.
If the number of PVs is set to 500, JTCS and TGC almost
have the same transportation performance in terms of the
number of transportation PVs in each hour, and the average trip
time. In JTCS and TGC, the average trip time of passengers
is about 14.6 minutes with the waiting time of 6.4 minutes
and the travel time (from pickup time to dropoff time) of 8.2
minutes.
The third metric is the number of transportation PVs in
each hour in JTCS and TGC, which is depicted by Fig. 9. We
see that, the two schemes almost have the same performances,
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Fig. 6. Real-time price (November 27, 2016) Fig. 7. Convergence of PVG strategies. Fig. 8. Convergence of PVG utilities.
Fig. 9. Number of transportation PVs in each hour. Fig. 10. Consumed energy in each hour. Fig. 11. Charged energy in each hour.
Fig. 12. Energy payment in each hour. Fig. 13. Average energy price and total payment. Fig. 14. Remaining energy of all PVs.
e.g., in transportation peak time (e.g., 8:00), about 400 PVs
should serve passengers, i.e., at most 100 PVs can charge
batteries. Generally, the number of PVs with sufficient energy
in JTCS is smaller than that in TGC since all PVs except
the transportation ones charge batteries in TGC, however,
JTCS has almost the same transportation performance as TGC
since it can coordinate the PVs in each region to satisfy the
transportation demands of passengers, which can be seen from
the first term in (3).
The fourth metric is the consumed energy in each hour,
which is shown by Fig. 10. We see that, the energy consump-
tions in JTCS are similar to that in TGC, since the cloud
in JTCS can coordinate the transportation demands of PVs
in each region of the city, and considers about the energy
consumptions in the next time slot, which is shown in the
second constraint in Problem (23).
The fifth metric is the charged energy in each hour, which is
presented by Fig. 11. We see that, the charged energy during
3:00-3:59, 6:00-13:59 and 16:00-22:59 in TGC is obviously
higher than that in JTCS. However, during 23:00-23:59, 1:00-
2:59, and 4:00-5:59, the charged energy of JTCS is higher
than that in TGC. We conclude that JTCS decides to charge
more energy at low RTPs, however, to ensure the transportation
performances of the next time slots, it decides to charge some
energy even at high RTPs.
The sixth metric is the energy payment in each hour using
JTCS and TGC, which is depicted by Fig. 12. We see that, the
profile of energy payment in each hour is similar to charged
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energy shown in Fig. 11. During night and noon time, the
energy payment in JTCS is high, while at other time the energy
payment may decrease to zero. The charged energy of JTCS
and TGC is 15,392 kwh and 19,315 kwh respectively. We see
that, PVs in JTCS charge less energy than that in TGC while
this does not affect the transportation services.
The seventh metric is the average energy price (the average
energy payment per kwh, US cents/kwh) and total payment
(US cents) using JTCS and TGC, which are together shown
by Fig. 13 with the same X-axis. We see that, the average
energy price in the JTCS algorithm is 10.86% less than TGC,
and the total energy payment of JTCS and TGC is 355 and 505
US dollars respectively, reduced by 29.8%. From this point of
view, the average energy price in JTCS is reduced without
reducing the transportation service quality since it considers
both the transportation demands and charging demands of
PVs. However, TGC only considers transportation with a
greedy charging strategy, therefore, the charging costs are
much higher than that in JTCS.
The eighth metric is the remaining energy of all PVs in each
hour, which is depicted by Fig. 14. We see that, the remaining
energy in JTCS is generally less than that in TGC. The
remaining energy in JTCS reduces quickly in transportation
morning and evening peak time, e.g., 8:00 and 18:00, however,
the remaining energy in GTC reduces very slowly, since more
PVs decide to charge batteries even the RTPs are in high levels,
which can reflect the effects of our scheme.
Finally, we discuss the scalability of JTCS over multiple
days. In JTCS, we assume that the final remaining energy
is not less than the initial energy in the day. To ensure the
validness of JTCS over multiple days, we should guarantee
the final energy of each day is not less than the consumed
energy of the next day. For example, if we expect the final
remaining energy of one day be more, we can revise the third
constraint of (23) in Algorithm 1 by increasing the right-hand
bound, since the higher is the right-hand bound, the more final
remaining energy PVs will have at the end of the day, and vice
versa.
Our proposed approach can be easily extended to the case
when the exact trip requests one day ahead are not known.
In particular, the cloud can use the past requests of a similar
day to predict the charging demands, e.g., on Monday, the
cloud can use the requests of the previous Monday or the
average of several Mondays. If the actual number of requests
is significantly different from the past, the cloud can adjust
the value of some parameters to adapt to the new scenarios.
For example, if the number of requests becomes much larger
than that of the past similar day, the cloud can increase the
charging demands E+t to ensure sufficient future energy.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
PV systems are new transportation systems for future smart
cities, where PVs are typically self-driving electric vehicles.
Transportation and charging coexist in PV systems, and to
balance transportation and charging demands, we use a cake
cutting game to capture the features of the PVGs and build
utility models. Then we analyze the existence and uniqueness
of Nash equilibrium in this game. Moreover, we propose
the JTCS algorithm to achieve the unique normalized Nash
equilibrium. Finally, we perform simulations based on the taxi
trip data and smart grid data of New York to evaluate its
performance. We find that, JTCS can provide almost the same
transportation services as TGC, however, the average energy
price is reduced by 10.86% compared with TGC.
There are several future works on this research. As previ-
ously mentioned, the proposed JTCS algorithm assumes that
the trip requests and the real-time price are known in advance,
however, in the real world, it is impossible. Therefore, the real-
time trip requests and real-time charging prices in uncertain
traffic and smart grid settings should be considered in the
future work. Obviously, new methods should be based on the
predication of trip demands of passengers and the real-time
electricity price. We only consider transportation and charging
in PV systems, however, in fact, a small part of PVs may be
willing to discharge batteries if the transportation demands
are small in their regions. We will consider the interactions
between transportation, charging, and discharging in the future
works.
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